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The Appearance of Awareness Related 
to Counter Intelligence in the Home 
Affairs Review in the Early  1960s
A kémelhárító tevékenységgel kapcsolatos tudatosító tevékenység 
megjelenése a Belügyi Szemlében az  1960-as évek elején
In the early  1960s, there were several events in the world and in Hungary that 
posed a decisive impact on the work of state security, including the field of counter 
intelligence. Political shifts in the socialist countries that began in the second half of 
the  1950s, including a confrontation with the former Stalinist system, the need to win 
over society in detecting crime, and the necessary broadening of relations between the 
two opposing blocs, all affected state security; also the reorganisation of the Ministry 
of the Interior (BM) in  1962, but also the rethinking of the professional journal of the 
Ministry of the Interior (Police Review) and its launch as the Home Affairs Review in 
 1963. The purpose of the present writing is to overview how those changes appeared 
in the articles of the Home Affairs Review with regard to one of the main areas of 
state security, the counter intelligence.
Keywords: state security, secret service, counter intelligence, awareness, Home Affairs 
Review
Az  1960-as évek elején több olyan esemény is történt a világban és Magyarországon, 
amely meghatározó volt a magyar állambiztonsági munka, azon belül is a kémelhárítás 
szempontjából. A szocialista országokban az  1950-es évek második felében elindult 
politikai irányváltás, többek között a korábbi, sztálini rendszerrel való szembefordulás, 
a társadalom megnyerésének igénye a bűncselekmények felderítésében vagy a két 
szemben álló tömb kapcsolatainak szükségszerű kiszélesedése mind-mind hatással 
volt az állambiztonság feladatellátására. Szintén idesorolható a Belügyminisztérium 
1 József Mezei is an Assistant Lecturer at the University of Public Service – Mezei József a Nemzeti Közszolgálati 
Egyetem egyetemi tanársegédje. E-mail: mezei.jozsef@uni-nke.hu, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-
2625-6317
József Mezei: The Appearance of Awareness Related to Counter Intelligence…
4 5Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle • 9. évfolyam (2021) 1. szám
(BM)  1962-es átszervezése, de a BM szakmai folyóiratának, a Rendőrségi Szemlének 
az újragondolása és Belügyi Szemleként történő  1963-as elindulása. Jelen írás célja 
annak áttekintése, hogy e változások hatásai hogyan jelentkeztek a Belügyi Szemle 
cikkeiben az állambiztonság egyik meghatározó területét, a kémelhárítási munkát 
érintően.
Kulcsszavak: állambiztonság, titkosszolgálat, kémelhárítás, biztonságtudatosítás, 
Belügyi Szemle
1. Introduction
By the  1960s, economic necessity forced European socialist countries to rethink 
and change their existing relations with the United States of America (USA) and the 
Western European countries. As a result, economic relations picked up and tourism 
started to grow dynamically.
In view of the international political situation, it was of paramount importance 
that in December  1962 the ‘Hungarian affair’ was removed from the United Nations 
(UN) agenda, and then in July  1963 the UN Secretary General, U Than, visited Hungary, 
which also had a positive effect on expanding international relations.
The widening of the existing interfaces between the countries of the two blocs 
provided an opportunity for the intelligence agencies to develop and increase their 
activities, and to take advantage of the opportunities created in this way.2 According 
to the Minister of the Interior, János Pap a significant change took place in the 
activities of foreign intelligence agencies: ‘Previously, they tried to organize agencies 
and networks mainly by traveller agents. Now they are trying to use the outbound 
and inbound tourist traffic for this purpose.’3
The counter intelligence had to meet the challenges posed by these changes, 
and the political expectations placed on them.
The issue of intelligence appeared on the political stage several times in Hungary 
around the  1960s. In September  1958, there was a press conference in the Parliament 
on the József Karsai’s case, who was spying for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
of the United States. They also used that press conference to ‘protest against U.S. 
hostile policy, against the broadcasts of Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe’.4 
In the early  1960s, János Kádár mentioned several times the importance of taking 
2 P H, ‘Polarizáció a nyugaton élő magyarság körében’ [Polarisation among Hungarians Living in the West], 
Belügyi Szemle  1, no  10 (1963),  31.
3 László Szabó and János Pap, ‘Adalék a rendőrség és a sajtó vitájához: lapjainkról nyilatkozik Pap János 
a Minisztertanács elnökhelyettese’ [Addendum to the Debate between the Police and the Press: János Pap, 
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comments on our Papers], Belügyi Szemle  2, no  3 (1964),  76.
4 Csaba Békés and Gusztáv D Kecskés (eds), A forradalom és a magyar kérdés az ENSZ-ben,  1956–1963: tanul-
mányok, dokumentumok és kronológia [The Revolution and the ‘Hungarian Affair’ in the UN,  1956–1963: 
Essays, Documents and Chronology] (Budapest: Magyar ENSZ Társaság,  2006),  43.
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action against spies5 and the need to condemn those involved in espionage.6 In order 
to settle relations with the UN, after the  1963 elections, ‘the government proposed 
to the Presidential Council the issuance of a pardon decree’.7 In this connection, János 
Kádár stated that he did not see much possibility of using amnesty8 in the case of spies.
János Kádár also expressed his opinion: ‘In addition to the first requirement 
of fidelity and unconditional devotion to the cause of socialism, the other, also 
indispensable requirement arises with increasing force: the competence, and the 
requirement of the necessary knowledge’.9
One of the practical consequences of this was that the previous professional 
and scientific journal of the internal affairs, the Police Review, was renewed along 
with the reorganisation of the Ministry of the Interior. The new journal, the Home 
Affairs Review, was considered a unified specialised journal of the Ministry of the 
Interior. According to the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior, the reason for 
its creation was that the party leadership ‘demands a new style of work, a higher 
level of political and professional knowledge from the personnel of the Ministry’.10 
Beyond conveying political ideas, the party leadership expected the Home Affairs 
Review ‘to fight against outdated views, obscurant practices, faulty methods, and 
take a party-spirited stance on the introduction of those methods, procedures and 
modern technical tools in the wide range of home affairs work that are the results 
of scientific achievements and keep pace with our daily lives’. As expected, such an 
interface was created that was suitable for conducting professional dialogues and for 
transferring knowledge and good practices needed to solve certain tasks, regardless 
of space or time.11
Both the state security organisations12 and the Home Affairs Review13 were under 
direct and close party control. Consequently, the writings published in the Home Affairs 
Review during the period under examination reflect the party’s position related to 
the Ministry of Defence, including state security work, the right orientations, tools 
and methods.
5 István Tímár, ‘A Magyar Népköztársaság Büntető Törvénykönyvéről’ [On the Criminal Code of the Hungarian 
People’s Republic], Rendőrségi Szemle  10, no  1 (1962),  12.
6 Országgyűlési napló [Minutes of Parliament], vol  1,  21 March  1963,  19.
7 „Kegyelmet kapnak bizonyos feltételek fennforgása esetén a háborús bűnösök is, a személyi kultusz évei-
ben a hatalommal visszaélő törvénysértők, az ellenforradalmi cselekményben bűnösök, és olyanok is, akik 
az elmúlt legutóbbi hat évben követtek el államellenes bűncselekményeket. Kegyelmet nyernek azok is, akik 
az ország területét engedély nélkül hagyták el.” [Provided that specific conditions are met, war criminals, 
those who misused power in the circumstances of personality cult, those who are guilty of taking part in the 
acts of counter-revolution, and those who committed treason in the last six years will be pardoned. Those 
who left the country without permission will also get pardon]. Országgyűlési napló [Minutes of Parliament], 
vol  1,  21 March  1963,  25.
8 Országgyűlési napló [Minutes of Parliament], vol  1,  21 March  1963,  540.
9 János Kádár’s statement is from the report at the  8th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
(MSZMP). It was published in each number of the Home Affairs Review for two years.
10 János Pap, ‘A „Belügyi Szemle” elé…’ [Preface to the Home Affairs Review], Belügyi Szemle  1, no  1 (1963),  11.
11 Ibid.  12.
12 István Kobolka, Nemzetbiztonsági alapismeretek [Fundamentals of National Security] (Budapest: Nemzeti 
Közszolgálati és Tankönyvkiadó,  2012),  17.
13 József Deák, ‘A Belügyi Szemle közpolitikai, rendészetelméleti és szerkezeti fejlődése a rendszerváltásig’ 
[Political, Theoretical and Structural Development of the Home Affairs Review until the Change of System], 
Hadtudományi Szemle  10, no  2 (2017),  345.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine which areas of counter intelligence and 
at what level considered the leadership of the party and of the Ministry of the Interior 
necessary to present in the Home Affairs Review as a reflection to the situation that 
had evolved by the early  1960s.
2. The appearance of counter intelligence in the Home Affairs 
Review
The statutory decree of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People’s Republic, 
Act No.  4 of  1963 on ‘The Exercise of Public Pardon’ was signed on  20 March 
 1963. The law provided that persons inter alia ‘who have left the territory of the 
country since its liberation without permission, public pardon shall be granted’.14 
One of the consequences of the decree, of the related legislation and of the political 
change behind, was that Hungarians living abroad could travel more easily or possibly 
repatriate.15
Among the phenomena accompanying the ‘policy of peaceful coexistence’,16 the 
growth of tourism, together with the amnesty decree, broadened the possibilities 
of the intelligence agencies of Western countries. Thus, even those who did not 
sympathise with the system and had previously left the country could be sent to the 
territory of the Hungarian People’s Republic as a representative of a business company, 
as a tourist, or as a relative. Here, these persons could even engage in intelligence 
activities (recruitment, contact, data collection). This option had significant advantages 
over the previous period.17 The ‘peak traffic of international events (fairs, football 
matches, car races, etc.), the mass entry’ also favoured the occasional entries.18
Moreover, the intelligence services also carried out talent-spotting activities 
among the growing number of Hungarian tourists19 and professionals20 traveling 
to the west. For that task they often employed research agents who had excellent 
command of Hungarian.21 The spotted person became a strong candidate, if he or 
she had an immediate relative in the west,22 he or she did not sympathise with the 
14 A Magyar Népköztársaság Elnöki Tanácsának  1963. évi  4. számú törvényerejű rendelete a közkegyelem 
gyakorlásáról [The Statutory Decree of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People’s Republic, Act 
No.  4 of  1963 on “The Exercise of Public Pardon”],  1–2.
15 H, ‘Polarizáció’,  31.
16 The  20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party held on  14–25 February  1956 gave up the theory of 
inevitable war and declared the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world.
17 Gábor Gidáli, ‘A hazalátogatás lehetőségével visszaélők néhány problémája és a BM szervek feladatai’ [Some 
of the Problems of Those Who Abuse the Opportunity to Visit Home and the Tasks of Home Affairs Bodies], 
Belügyi Szemle  4, no  4 (1966),  18.
18 Zs O, ‘A kémügynök nyugatnémet turista’ [The West German Tourist Spy], Belügyi Szemle  2, no  7 (1964), 
 102.
19 F K, ‘A Bundes Nachrichtendienst „Tibet” fedőnevű ügynöke’ [The Agent of the Bundes Nachrichtendienst 
under the Cover Name “Tibet”], Belügyi Szemle  2, no  8 (1964),  85.
20 I T and L R, ‘Az amerikai hírszerzés „Horváth János” fedőnevű ügynöke’ [The Agent of the American Intel-
ligence under the Cover Name “János Horváth”], Belügyi Szemle  2, no  10 (1964),  75.
21 K, ‘A Bundes Nachrichtendienst „Tibet” fedőnevű ügynöke’,  85.
22 Ibid.  85.
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system and was willing to take active actions against it, or possibly he or she used 
to be an employee or collaborator23 of an intelligence organisation before the war.
The territory of non-socialist European countries24 was an ideal platform for 
the recruitment of these individuals. There was less risk to accomplish the testing, 
the recruitment and the training of the candidates and there was no need to fear 
counter intelligence agencies.
Risks associated with the growth of tourism affected also other socialist countries. 
According to an article in the  14th issue of Pogranichnik (Borderguard – a journal) 
in  1965, the U.S. and the FRG were engaged in significant intelligence activities in 
the Soviet Union, using the expanded economic relations and tourism. Tourists, 
scientists and students were involved in their activities. They saw scientific congresses, 
exhibitions and study scholarships as opportunities. In addition to the information 
gathering on military, politics, economy and recruiting, they were disseminating 
materials promoting the Western way of life and criticising the communist ideology.25
With the boom in tourism, changes took place also in the field of alien 
administration/immigration work. According to the professional opinion, in case of 
such a large number of entrants, ‘… it is already impossible … and unnecessary, to 
control all the citizens entering or transiting the country, coming from a capitalist 
country’. The solution was found in increasing the efficiency of filtering and detecting.26 
In order to facilitate the controlling activity, foreigners were allowed to stay in 
the country only with a permit. In case of a short term stay, their visa inside their 
passports served as a permit. This permit was issued by the National Central Authority 
for Controlling Aliens which also could prolong the permit. Foreign nationals had to 
check in within  24 hours of entering at the district or city police stations. The Police 
and district officials were obliged to oversee whether the check-ins had taken place.27
The fact that the citizens who emigrated during the  1956 revolution and in the 
subsequent period were interviewed by the staff of Western intelligence organisations 
in the refugee camps in order to obtain relevant military, political and economic 
information, as well as to spot the potential candidates for intelligence activity, had 
significant impact on counter intelligence activity.28 This partial-information obtained 
that way was used for the completion and correction of available data on the country 
and for carrying out certain intelligence operations.29 It happened that contacts and 
working relationships were established among the emigrant Hungarians, who later 
also took part in the recruitment of Hungarian citizens.30
23 Ibid.  86.
24 T and R, ‘Az amerikai hírszerzés „Horváth János” fedőnevű ügynöke’,  76.
25 E Pincsukov, ‘Turistáknak álcázott kémek: nemkívánatos vendégek: kivonatos közlés a „Pogranicsnik” 
 1965. évi  14. számából’ [Spies Disguised as Tourists: Unwanted Guests: Extract from Issue  14 of  1965 of 
“Pogranichnik”], Belügyi Szemle  4, no  5 (1966),  120–124.
26 János Bozsik, ‘A BM idegenrendészeti munkájának néhány problémája’ [Some Problems of Immigration 
Work at the Ministry of the Interior], Belügyi Szemle  4, no  5 (1966),  18.
27 Ibid.  19.
28 O, ‘A kémügynök nyugatnémet turista’,  97.
29 Ibid.  98.
30 Károly Józsa, ‘Egy nyugatnémet kémügynök ügye’ [The Case of a West German Spy], Belügyi Szemle  2, no  12 
(1964),  81.
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Several case studies were presented during the examined period in the Review, as 
part of which several essential elements of intelligence activities were also presented. 
With regard to the future collaboration, the first step in establishing the relationship 
with the agent was to map his basic circumstances, which also included the person’s 
‘lifestyle, political attitude, family circumstances, financial situation, and personal 
characteristics’. Hungarian tourists could spend only a limited period of time abroad, 
so there was limited time for establishing the relationship of trust, necessary to 
establish relationship with the agent. For this reason, the solution could be several, 
short time personal meetings. During the concrete invitation for the collaboration, 
the glorification of personal abilities, the trivialisation of the tasks and the work 
necessary to be performed, and emphasising the almost complete impossibility of 
being discovered were always part of the conversation.31 Sometimes, if the person did 
not agree, later someone else contacted him and tried to convince him to cooperate 
with the intelligence organisation.32 In some cases, the recruitment was done not 
on behalf of the particular intelligence agency, but for an international organisation 
to persuade the person more easily for the intelligence work.33 When the agent 
was recruited, he signed the statement of cooperation and the acknowledgment of 
receipt of the amount of money transferred for the cooperation,34 and he received 
his cover name.35
The following training of the agent included the information on agent handling, 
information on contacting, as well as the intelligence/information requirement. In most 
cases, the training included both theoretical and practical parts. Western intelligence 
agencies wanted to gain information through agents mostly about military objects 
and military equipment.36 In addition, it was often a task to identify individuals who 
could have been employed as agents.37 If the agent was debriefed personally, his 
reliability was also checked by using a polygraph/lie detector.38
For agent handling, the method of impersonal contact was used primarily due 
to the circumstances during this period. Therefore, the recruited agents had to be 
trained at the first meeting for at least one way of communication. One of the most 
commonly used practice for transmitting information to one and other were the 
encrypted,39 encoded40 letters. To do this, the agent had to be taught to use the 
needed chemical in order to retrieve the letters written,41 to encrypt and to structure 
the report,42 which also included security features. The letters were sent by the agent 
31 K, ‘A Bundes Nachrichtendienst „Tibet” fedőnevű ügynöke’,  86.
32 Ibid.  86.
33 O, ‘A kémügynök nyugatnémet turista’,  99.
34 Ibid.  101.
35 K, ‘A Bundes Nachrichtendienst „Tibet” fedőnevű ügynöke’,  86.
36 Ernő Bán, Kémek – hazaárulók [Spies – Traitors] (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó,  1966),  24.
37 K, ‘A Bundes Nachrichtendienst „Tibet” fedőnevű ügynöke’,  86.
38 O, ‘A kémügynök nyugatnémet turista’,  101.
39 They used a certain chemical to make the written text invisible on the paper and then a cover text was 
written over in normal ink.
40 Encoding a text by changing the letters into numbers.
41 O, ‘A kémügynök nyugatnémet turista’,  99.
42 K, ‘A Bundes Nachrichtendienst „Tibet” fedőnevű ügynöke’,  86.
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under a cover name to a pre-arranged foreign address.43 This method was also used 
for agent handling, but there were also encrypted messages sent by the intelligence 
agencies to their agents at a predetermined wavelength and at certain time, which 
the agent could listen to on his regular radio. However, in some cases, there was 
a need for personal meeting. In order to be able to use it in all circumstances, they 
agreed in advance during the training on what password (“Schneider”) and/or what 
sign-object would use the person visiting the agent in order to identify himself. (That 
sign-object could be a photo,44 a pocket knife scratched in a particular place, or even 
a black woodpecker decorated with silver.45) Of course, the agent had to have the 
same sign-object.
Regarding the case studies published in the Review, it is worth noting that the 
authors of those articles provided details from the investigation in their writings: 
‘The box of matches has arrived, we are now evaluating it. In the future, we will 
communicate by encrypted letters. Reduce your reports to  2–3 a year, we will send 
only one or two letters.’46 (Note: Response from the U.S. intelligence agency to its 
Hungarian agent, who sent the photocopies of the secret minutes of the spring 
meeting  1959 COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Aid) in a matchbox to a safe 
address.) Another: ‘…Materials exposed to the intelligence agency, I did not have to 
get them from elsewhere, these materials were in my possession in the office, they 
belonged to my field of work. I do not want to bring up the shortcomings of the 
Ministry’s secret case management in my defence, but I had no difficulty in sending 
those materials – listed in the previous protocol – abroad, because no one would 
ever look for them, they had no registration…’.47
Occasionally, the perpetrator’s personality was presented and evaluated in the 
publication, the authors summarised the causes and the circumstances of the crime 
that made the perpetration possible.48 By making the publication interesting, they 
also helped the Review to achieve the goal of disseminating professional knowledge 
to the BM (Ministry of the Interior) staff. Taking into account the extremely short 
period (one or two years) between the case and the publication, it required the 
permission of the senior professional management and political permission, due to 
the close relationship between the state party and the state security body.
The case studies published in the Home Affairs Review often provided very detailed 
information on the intelligence in a given case, but – in protection of the tools and 
methods – the way in which the case was detected, generally was not mentioned.
Perhaps the multiplication of tasks provided an incentive for the possibility of 
applying prevention in relation to crimes against the state.
The Act on the Code of Criminal Procedure,49 Article  13 adopted in  1962, made the 
signalisation mandatory for the investigating authorities during criminal proceedings, 
43 T and R, ‘Az amerikai hírszerzés „Horváth János” fedőnevű ügynöke’,  78.
44 O, ‘A kémügynök nyugatnémet turista’,  99.
45 T and R, ‘Az amerikai hírszerzés „Horváth János” fedőnevű ügynöke’,  77.
46 Ibid.  80.
47 Józsa, ‘Egy nyugatnémet kémügynök ügye’,  83.
48 Ibid.  85.
49  1962. évi  8. törvényerejű rendelet a büntető eljárásról [The  8th Decree on the Criminal Procedure of  1962].
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at the same time obliged the notified bodies to provide information within a period of 
 30 days, in which they had to notify the criminal authority of their adopted preventive 
measures. In this context, it was suggested that in case of espionage, it would be 
worthwhile to examine the possibility of signalisation. In the course of proceedings 
when intelligence activity was detected and proved, state security personnel identified 
numerous circumstances that made possible the illegal acquirement of a state secret. 
It is easy to understand that the professional assessment was correct according to 
which providing information to the organisation in question could have significantly 
reduced the occurrence of further illegal activities.50 In addition to that, the idea of 
out-of-court signalisation was raised, which on the other hand raised a number of 
legal issues. The idea of signalisation within the criminal proceedings, would have 
provided the possibility of sharing relevant information on the certain crime with 
the personnel of the organisation concerned.51 The latter also served the current 
need of politics, for the sake of winning the society which must be get involved as 
much as possible in the detection and prevention of crime.
The Home Affairs Review itself also had such a preventive role, as the entire home 
affairs personnel gained basic knowledge about the espionage, its actors and forms 
through articles dealing with the field of counter intelligence. Thus, even the traffic 
policeman could provide information – such as the appearance of a car with a foreign 
license plate in the vicinity of an object of state security relevance – that could help 
to detect a case and prevent such acts. The idea of prevention was also served by 
the fact that lectures were held on counter intelligence52 at the law enforcement 
facilities, and to students (future detectives, political investigators) in the vocational 
schools of the Ministry of the Interior who studied the history of intelligence as a part 
of legal studies and as a part of their ideology education.53
In addition to the U.S. intelligence services, the Gehlen organisation in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and its successor, the Federal Intelligence Service 
(Bundesnachrichtendienst – BND), were the main challenges for the counter intelligence 
during the examined period.54 Certainly for this reason, the knowledge about these 
intelligence organisations that deserve attention in terms of counter intelligence also 
appeared on the pages of the Review. With regard to the BND, its responsibilities 
included intelligence, analysis and information, and also the implementation of 
‘subversive activities’. It had its own counter intelligence organisation, which was of 
paramount importance in case another intelligence agency wanted to establish an 
intelligence position in the BND. The BND relied on German communities living abroad, 
as well as non-governmental organisations that provided adequate opportunities 
and coverage to carry out intelligence activities, such as the network of Research 
50 Dezsőné Pásztor, ‘Az állam elleni bűncselekmények megelőzésének néhány kérdése’ [Some Questions of 
the Prevention of Crimes against the State], Belügyi Szemle  2, no  12 (1964),  25.
51 The Constitution Protection Office of Hungary, which accomplishes the tasks of Counter Intelligence, started 
its Awareness Program almost  60 years later, in  2011.
52 Béla Vincze, ‘A parancsnokok közéleti tevéknységéről’, [About the Public Life of Commanders], Belügyi 
Szemle  1, no  1 (1963),  18.
53 János Winkler, ‘Világnézeti nevelés a belügyi iskolákon’ [Ideological Education in the Schools of the Ministry 
of the Interior], Belügyi Szemle  4, no  3 (1966),  10.
54 K, ‘A Bundes Nachrichtendienst „Tibet” fedőnevű ügynöke’,  85.
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Institutes on the East.55 The CIA was also presented, based on an evaluation written 
of a book, a reminiscent of an ‘advertising brochures’ in terms of content, by The 
Profession of Reconnaissance former CIA chief Allen Dulles. The responsibilities of the 
CIA included ‘espionage, subversion, coups, and political assassinations, defamatory 
and incentive propaganda’.56 The main targets of its intelligence activities were 
the Soviet Union and socialist countries. As regards the Soviet Union, the primary 
intelligence requirement was information on the Army: ‘We need to know as much as 
possible about their forces and plans, their military technology, and especially their 
depots, nuclear bombs, planes and other means of the attack force…’ The tools and 
methods of the CIA included: ‘…bribery, extortion, lying and slander, eavesdropping on 
conversations, stealing documents; interception or screening of letters, cryptographic 
methods…’ Overall, the writing criticised the organisation for its almost unlimited 
power and for its activities threatening peace. He pointed out that some American 
politicians had also said that the CIA was acting as an ‘invisible government’.57 The 
author closed the line with a cynical remark, that in the time of Allan Dulles, the 
abbreviation CIA was interpreted as ‘caught in the action’.58 No publications based 
on information on foreign intelligence agencies were published during the period 
under examination. The broadening of the horizons of the BM personnel in this field 
was realised indirectly through knowledge taken from foreign journals, and within 
the framework of case studies published in the section Lapszemle (Press Review). It is 
easy to understand why the publishing of our own knowledge could have significantly 
reduced the effectiveness of the counter activity.
Besides classical intelligence, the disruptive policy pursued by the West also 
strengthened. The aim of this was to increase social dissatisfaction with the government 
and the state party in the socialist countries and to strengthen the contradiction 
between the socialist countries.59 In order to achieve this goal, psychological warfare 
centres were used such as the Radio Free Europe (SZER);60 the CIA was behind it 
during this period. According to the Home Affairs, it openly ‘instigated’ and called 
on workers to ‘oppose’ the government’s economic policy measures. These changes 
also ‘multiplied’ and ‘complicated’ the tasks of state security agencies.61 As regards 
the ‘instigation’ crimes within the scope of crimes against the state, the perpetrators 
listened to the ‘hostile, insulting broadcasts’ of Radio Free Europe (SZER) on several 
occasions and committed their actions under its influence. They painted inscriptions 
55 J Mahder, ‘A nyugatnémet felderítő szolgálatról’ [About the West German Reconnaissance Service], Belügyi 
Szemle  2, no  8 (1964),  117–120.
56 ‘Allen Dulles emlékirata’ [The Memoirs of Allen Dulles], Belügyi Szemle  2, no  11 (1964),  114.
57 Ibid.  114.
58 Ibid.  117.
59 Bedő et al., Az imperialisták fellazítási taktikája [Disruptive Tactics of the Imperialists] (Budapest: Kossuth 
Könykiadó,  1968).
60 István Bekő, ‘Az USA lélektani hadviseléséről’ [About the Psychological Warfare of the USA], Belügyi Szemle 
 1, no  5 (1963),  15.
61 László Eperjesi, ‘Az MSZMP Központi Bizottsága  1965. november  18–20-i és december  8-i ülésének hatá-
rozataiból adódó belügyi feladatok’ [The Tasks of Law Enforcement after the  8th Session of the Central 
Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party], Belügyi Szemle  4, no  2 (1966),  9.
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on the walls criticising the system,62 they made flyers and disseminated them by which 
they propagated ‘hostile propaganda’.63 As regards the crimes committed by juveniles, 
the ‘ideological connection with the hostile ideological, disruptive activities of spy 
and propaganda organisations’ almost always could be established.64 On the other 
hand, the responsibility of parents also arose. They listened to the radio with the 
young people but ‘did not enlighten them about the hostility and lies they heard’.65 
An investigation into a group of juveniles revealed information that ‘juveniles, having 
heard a radio show about spies being “well paid”, were determined to present 
themselves at intelligence agencies in case they get abroad’.66
The first publication in the Home Affairs Review, were the thoughts of the 
Minister of the Interior, János Pap on lawfulness, among the others: ‘We have 
learned from the mistakes of the past and we are not chasing anyone innocent.’67 In 
connection with this line, it is worth noting that the crimes against the state, including 
espionage,68 stipulated by the new Criminal Code69 adopted in  1961, were described 
and interpreted in a publication in  1962, and in case of significant changes, compared 
them with those of the previous Act.70 The legislation took a step towards prevention 
and the ‘involvement’ of society in crime prevention as a political goal. It was stated 
that, on the one hand, a Hungarian citizen recruited by a foreign intelligence service 
cannot be punished if he/she ‘voluntarily reports to the authority before commencing 
intelligence and fully discovers his relationship with the intelligence organisation’.71 
On the other hand, if someone becomes aware of preparation for intelligence 
62 János Kastyák, ‘Feliratos izgatás bűntettének nyomozása a helvéciai állami gazdaságban’ [Investigation of 
Instigation Crime Committed through Inscriptions in a State Farm in Helvécia], Belügyi Szemle  1, no  1 (1963), 
 88.
63 Mihály Kada and Kálmán Hegedűs, ‘Névtelen fenyegető levelek és izgató röpcédulaterjesztők felderítése’ 
[Detection of Anonymous Letters of Threat and Distributors of Instigating Flyers], Belügyi Szemle  1, no  4 
(1963),  102.
64 Tibor Kása, ‘A fiatalkorúak által elkövetett államellenes bűntettek tapasztalatai’ [The Experience of Crimes 
against the State Committed by Juveniles], Belügyi Szemle  2, no  12 (1964),  70.
65 Kastyák, ‘Feliratos izgatás bűntettének nyomozása’,  88.
66 Kása, ‘A fiatalkorúak által elkövetett államellenes bűntettek tapasztalatai’,  72.
67 Pap, ‘A „Belügyi Szemle” elé…’.
68  1961. évi V. törvény a Magyar Népköztársaság Büntető Törvénykönyvének  131. §-a szerint: ‘Aki külföldi 
kormány, külföldi szervezet vagy ezek megbízottja részére hírszerző tevékenységre ajánlkozik vagy vállalkozik, 
öt évtől tizenkét évig terjedő szabadságvesztéssel büntetendő. Aki a Magyar Népköztársaság hátrányára 
felhasználható adatokat abból a célból szerez meg, gyűjt vagy szolgáltat ki, hogy az adat külföldi kormánynak, 
külföldi szervezetnek vagy ezek megbízottjának tudomására jusson, tíz évtől tizenöt évig terjedő szabad-
ságvesztéssel büntetendő.’ [By the terms of Article  131 of the Act on the Criminal Code of the Hungarian 
People’s Republic: ‘Anyone who offers to conduct intelligence activity for a foreign government, foreign 
organisation, or for the representative of those shall be sentenced from five to twelve years of imprisonment. 
Anyone who obtains, collects or disseminates data in disadvantage of the Hungarian People’s Republic in 
order to inform foreign governments, foreign organisations or their representatives, shall be sentenced 
from ten to fifteen years of imprisonment.’]
69  1961. évi V. törvény a Magyar Népköztársaság Büntető Törvénykönyvéről [Act No.  5 of  1961 on the Criminal 
Code of the Hungarian People’s Republic]. Online: www.jogiportal.hu/index.php?id=qko4y25brxtctd8vw&s-
tate=19790414&menu=view
70 Péter Barna, ‘Állam elleni bűntettek az új Btk-ban’ [Crimes against the State in the New Criminal Code], 
Rendőrségi Szemle  10, no  3 (1962),  222.
71  1961. évi V. tv.  131. § (5) [Article  131, (5) of the Act No. V of  1961].
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activity and does not inform the authority ‘as soon as he or she can’, he or she shell 
be sentenced to imprisonment.72
In addition to legality, another important political call of the period was 
‘competence’, which was in Kádár’s quote mentioned in the Home Affairs Review. In 
order to achieve that goal, and to achieve the required scientific knowledge in the 
field of home affairs, it would be useful to ‘scientifically’ process certain cases such 
as crimes against the state, incitement and conspiracy, related to certain evolutional 
stages of ‘people’s democracy’, taking into account the foreign and domestic political 
events and the essential elements of forensic science. It would help to determine 
the directions and methods of counter actions against these acts, as well as the 
preventive activity with the involvement of society.73 Moreover, there was a need to 
examine the relationship between individual crimes against the public law and the 
state, as in several cases it was established that persons involved in intelligence cases, 
also committed currency offenses in connection with their activities.74 Besides, the 
need was formulated to analyse the personality and background of the perpetrators, 
especially the recidivists, in order to reduce repeated crimes.75 The joint commission 
of a currency crime and espionage76 at that time was understandable due to objective 
circumstances. Western intelligence agencies paid their agents in foreign currency, but 
Hungarian citizens had a legal obligation to report the currency in their possession.
According to the Interior Minister’s assessment, the society was increasingly 
supporting state security work by the early  1960s, which was reflected in the 
agreement to report information indicating crimes77 and the agreement to capture 
intelligence officers.78
3. Summary
All in all, it can be said that changes took place in Hungary in the early  1960s that had 
a significant impact on the counter intelligence tasks carried out by the Hungarian 
state security agencies. The number of challenges had increased and new types of 
risks had emerged. As a result of the review of the writings in the Internal Affairs 
Review, it can be established that the Ministry of the Interior tried to present counter 
intelligence and related areas extensively. In most cases, the writings were not 
simple statements of facts, but analysis, evaluations and writings that formulated 
new ideas. Certainly, we cannot ignore the fact that the close party oversight was 
one of the main features of the period; however, the Home Affairs Review tried to 
fulfil the function for which it was created.
72  1961. évi V. tv.  132. § (1) [Article  132, (1) of the Act No. V of  1961].
73 Tibor Kása, ‘Néhány gondolat „A szocialista kriminológia helyzete és programja” című tanulmányhoz’ [Some 
Thoughts on the Study of “The Situation and Programs of Socialist Criminology”], Belügyi Szemle  4, no  1 
(1966),  67.
74 Ibid.  68.
75 Ibid.  68.
76  1961. évi V. törvény,  131. § [Article  131, of the Act No. V of  1961].
77 Pap, ‘A „Belügyi Szemle” elé…’,  9.
78 Ibid.  10.
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